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The text presents and discusses John Searle’s taxonomy of rule, introducing a new type: 
the emergent rule. it also explains the importance of the emergent rule for the social 
reality. Searle thinks that the social reality is the outcome of a construction, but he is 
wrong. The emergent social reality is not constructed, nor can it be. To accept this leads 
to a drastic change in the theory and the paper tries to bring the reader to this new 
perspective within the fileld of social philosophy.
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the social theory provided by John Searle is powerful: with a few basic 
notions (status functions, assignment of function, deontic powers, 
constitutive rules, institutional facts, collective intentionality), Searle 
is able to explain much of the social reality. Unfortunately, not all that 
counts in the social reality is explained by Searle’s theory. there are 
several important aspects missing from Searle’s account, or not properly 
represented. For example, his theory is not able to give a good account of 
social realities such as friendship or charismatic leadership.
Searle writes: “all institutional facts, and therefore all status functions, are 
created by speech acts of a type that in 1975 i baptized as ‘declarations’ ” 
(Searle 2010, 11). according to Searle friendship is a social institution. But 
it is a matter of fact that friendship is not the outcome of any declaration, 
except in some special cases, such as political alliances. Besides, there are 
status functions, such that of being a friend (with related powers and duties) 
which do not come from any declaration. Friendship is not instituted, not 
even informally: yet, it is an important social reality. in general, within 
the framework of Searle’s theory it is not possible to understand friendship 
and the other social bounds. to solve this problem one should leave the 
constructivist approach, which is too narrow. one important step towards 
a theory able to address the complexity of the social reality consists in 
introducing the notion of emergent rule.
in what follows i will try to show that one important weakness of Searle’s 
social theory depends on the philosopher’s partial understanding of the 
existing types of rule. the next paragraph will present and discuss Searle’s 
taxonomy of rule, introducing a new type, the emergent rule. the third 
paragraph will discuss some emergent rules within the social reality. Searle 
thinks that the social reality is the outcome of a construction, but the 
truth is that this is not the whole story. the emergent social reality is not 
constructed, nor can it be. to accept this leads to a drastic change in the 
theory. Such a change would bring Searle’s social philosophy down to the 
real complex social world.
John Searle distinguishes between constitutive and regulative rules 
(Searle 1995). Constitutive rules define something social in such a way that 
otherwise it would not exist. the game of soccer, for example, would not 
be possible without the rules of soccer (e.g. “the team scoring the greater 
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number of goals during a match is the winner. if both teams score an equal 
number of goals, or if no goals are scored, the match is a draw”). the same is 
true with the game of chess so that, without its rules (e.g. “if a player’s king 
is placed in check and there is no legal move that player can make to escape 
check, then the king is said to be checkmated, the game ends, and that 
player loses”), the game would not be possible. if the winning rule of chess is 
changed, the activity that results is not chess anymore. in general, if there 
is at least one change to a constitutive rule (cr) of a given social activity, the 
result is a dramatic, substantial, change of that activity. the regulative rule 
(rr), on the other hand, regulates something which exists independently 
from the rule. in fact, driving a car is an activity that does not depend for 
its existence on rules such as “drive on the right”. Similarly, using black 
and white pieces instead of red and green ones does not effect the game 
called chess. the rules in these cases do not constitute the activity. Searle’s 
constitutive-regulative distinction (crd) allows to differentiate between 
two kinds of activity. on one side, there are the activities which get their 
meaning from the rule constituting them. on the other side, there are the 
activities which do not depend on the rule for their existence, but they are 
someway ordered by the rule.
i argue that the crd is not enough to give a good account of the relevant 
types of social rule. the taxonomy must be expanded. it is possible to 
improve the explicative power of Searle’s social theory based on the study of 
the social rules by distinguishing between instituted rule (ir) and emergent 
rule (er). hence, the taxonomic tree is:
the ir depends on an explicit social act, or on an explicit social procedure, 
instituting the rule. the positive law is perhaps the most classic kind of rule 
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instantiating the ir. Social institutions, such as governments and parliaments 
(instituted by positive laws), in exercising their functions enforce this kind 
of rule as well. the law is valid when the acts instituting the law follow the 
required procedure. it is worthwhile to notice that a valid law could not be 
effective if it were not accepted. the acceptance could come from a common 
explicit agreement, but this last is not a necessary condition of acceptance. in 
fact, an ir could be a hated law instituted by a ruler (e.g. a king) who made the 
decision on his own. One sufficient condition to have an effective IR (say r) is that 
a sufficient number of subjects (where the number is determined by contingent 
circumstances) would comply with r, eventually reluctantly. effectiveness 
then should not be confused with validity and it should not be confused with 
legitimacy either. this last statement means that the valid rule must not be 
wrong or, according to a weaker perspective, it must not be considered wrong by 
the majority. Some significant formal relations between effectiveness, validity 
and legitimacy are the following: (a) it may be the case that an effective rule is 
not valid, nor legitimate; (b) if a rule is legitimate, then it is valid; (c) a valid rule 
remains such, even if it is not effective.
Following Searle’s distinction the type ir can be divided into two subtypes: 
regulative rule (RR) and constitutive rule (CR). The first ones are conventions 
such as “do not talk with your mouth full”, “nod to say yes and shake to say 
no”, “thumbs-up to mean ok”. they may be dependent on some objective 
circumstances such as talking with the mouth full could result in one spitting 
out some food (which is disgusting). Usually, they are purely conventional.
the cr brings into human life a variety of social entities such as money, 
football championships, laws, presidents, armies, trade unionists, banks, 
taxes, hospitals, and companies. of course, in a complex society there is not 
one single authority that enforces all the rules. For example, some rules 
are enforced by people with a superior knowledge; some rules are enforced 
because some people were in charge; some are enforced just because 
some people were involved in a situation which needed coordination. the 
effectiveness of these rules depends on the mechanism of acceptance. 
Sometimes the social context, for religious, political or cultural reasons, 
does not accept the decisions made and so the rules are dropped or at least 
modified. This shows that acceptance is not granted and that it has its own 
mechanisms which are worthy of further discussion in a separate work.
Searle does not recognize any other kind of social rule, except rr and cr. 
indeed they cover a very wide range of cases. no surprise that Searle did 
not notice any other kind of rule. this happened also because of his desire 
to provide the simplest explanation of the social reality, reducing it to its 
constructed dimension.
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the second type of social rule (er) is such that the rules emerge from a 
given set of preexisting rules (ers and/or irs) and/or some contingent 
circumstances. given a set of rules (s) and eventually some external 
conditions (c1-cn), a rule (r) is emergent on s if: it is never the case that s + (c1-cn), 
but not r. that the rule is emerging means that it is effective, without being 
instituted (for this reason validity and legitimacy cannot be applied to er). it 
may be the case that r is also instituted to give it strength or, simply, to give it 
social (political, juridical) recognition. this just means a possible redundancy 
of the practice of instituting, since r was ruling also before being instituted. 
there may be practical reasons to recommend such redundancy.
the square rule (Sr) in chess is a good example of the emergence of a rule 
(of course, not of a social one). the rule helps to know if in endgame of king 
and pawn against king, the pawn will be able to queen unassisted. and this 
is the rule: “Starting from the pawn, draw an imaginary diagonal line to the 
side of the board where the pawn can queen: this forms the diagonal line of 
the square we are looking for. if the king can get inside the square, the pawn 
will be captured, otherwise it will promote”. in the diagram below the black 
king will not to stop the pawn.
the Sr (r) is dependent on the rules of chess (s) and some empirical 
circumstances (c1-cn). the Sr is autonomous from the rules of chess in so 
far as it is a new rule. the Sr is normative, ruling the behaviour of the chess 
player. the Sr emerges from the existing rules of chess and from some 
circumstances. in fact if, for example, the king would move as a pawn, or 
if the space were curved (the first vertical file being connected with the 
eighth), the Sr would not emerge. the Sr belongs to a new type of rule, 
not reducible to the IRs. It is not a CR, since it does not define the game 
Figure 1.
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of chess. It is not even mentioned in the official rules and people can play 
the game without even knowing it. the Sr is not a rr either, since it is not 
conventional, it has rather the character of a necessity. nevertheless, the 
SR, as any ER, cannot be reduced to a logical necessity. From a first person 
perspective, it is normative: it rules the behaviour of the player.
Some ers of the social reality are discussed in the context of the game 
theory by thomas Schelling (1960), though the author does not name them 
ers. Without communicating, agents are able to coordinate their actions. 
For example, if a man loses his wife in a mall, the two will be probably able 
to find each other easily at the information office, or in a central point of the 
mall. Schelling reports, among many examples, that people are usually able 
to successfully solve the problem, if asked to meet someone in new york, 
knowing the day, but not the place, nor the hour. the solution usually given 
is: central Station, in front of the information desk, at noon. emerging from 
the need to find each other, that is from the rule “Find the other person”, 
and from the structure of the place, the general rule is: “go to the most 
obvious place at the most obvious time”. of course a common background 
knowledge should be given to solve the coordination problem. But here the 
interesting thing is that the situation itself gives some focal points that help 
the coordination, allowing the formation of the er.
taking an example from Searle himself, which does not grasp its emergent 
side, when the political and economical situation in russia in 1990 and 
1991 forced the people not to accept the currency, one new rule emerged. 
interestingly enought it was applied also by non-smokers and was “pay 
with marlboro cigarettes” (Searle 1995, 43). this is a typical er, since it 
depends on some circumstances and rules. the general circumstance is the 
economical weakness of the country and the rules involved are: “do not 
accept rubles”; “What is used as money must be sufficiently diffused, but not 
too abundant”; “What is used as money must be easy to use and cannot be 
easily falsified”; and finally, “Pay with something that will be accepted by 
the others”. these rules, plus the circumstance that the marlboro cigarettes 
were a good candidate, gave the new er.
ers can be found even among enemies. an interesting example is given by 
life in the trenches during the First World War, when enemies on the two 
sides adopted the same rule: “live and let live”. it meant to avoid shooting 
at the enemies. except in case of attack, of course. “live and let live” is 
an emergent rule from: “Survive”; “if you shoot, the enemy will react”; 
“Without any direct order, you are not supposed to do anything”.
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are sufficient to show the existence of ERs, but they do not regard the more 
ordinary cases of everyday life. on the contrary, emergence is more frequent 
than it is usually thought (for more see (Ullman-margalit 1977)). Friendship or 
neighborhood, with their social duties of solidarity, emerge from a repetition 
of social interaction. Searle writes: “Something can be a mountain even if 
no one believes it is a mountain; something can be a molecule even if no one 
thinks anything at all about it. But for social facts, the attitude that we take 
toward the phenomenon is partly constitutive of the phenomenon” (Searle 
1995, 33). he does not realize that this idea works for the instituted reality, 
but not for the emergent one. People are friends, but sometimes they do not 
realize it. they may act for a long time according to the er proper of the social 
bond of friendship built on some rules. in a very simplistic gallery such rules 
are, for instance: “trust a”, “Be benevolent toward a”, “help a”, where a is a 
person. Friends may not be aware of an existing social bond between them, as 
the chess player could not be aware of his following the Sr.
Some important social phenomena as successions or decisions about which 
job to choose are coming from emergence. to explain this i will refer to the 
case of traffic jams discussed by Mitchel Resnick. With the help of a program 
simulating the behaviour of the cars, he observed that traffic jams are 
inevitable in the cases in which the cars are disposed randomly and there is 
the rule “if you see another car close ahead, slow down; if not, speed up”. What 
happens is well expressed in the book: “the jam itself moves backward. if you 
keep eye on one car, it leaves the traffic jam, but the jam itself, I mean where 
you see the cars piling up, moves backwards” (resnick 1997, 74). therefore the 
emergent rule is: “the cars move forward, the jam moves backwards”.
Figure 2. Traffic jams (from Resnick 1997, 72)
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the system tends to conserve the information of the jam, even if the 
individuals involved are changing from time to time. Something similar 
happens in the society. For example, when a person with a role retires, the 
system tends to conserve itself by attracting new individuals to fill the 
empty space. the metaphor of invisible hand, coined by adam Smith, is a 
simplistic way to refer to cases in which emergent mechanisms are present 
in society.
to understand some rules of social behaviour that help in discussing the 
emergent phenomena of authority, a software simulation will help again. 
Simulating flocks, Craig Reynolds was able to create a realistic program. 
he used only three rules applied in the simulation by the individual (called 
boid): separation (steer to avoid crowding local flockmate), alignment (steer 
towards the average heading of local flockmates), cohesion (steer to move 
toward the average position of local flockmates).
Here we have an emergent social collective behaviour, that is the flock 
movement. From this model it becomes evident that if a boid will change 
its direction (with a random function), the other boids nearby will change 
accordingly. In a sense, it is true that flocks are emerging in the simulation, 
without any authority imposing anything on anyone. in this sense we have 
here collective ordered behaviours, without external coordination. But it 
must be remembered that the rules are constitutive of the behaviour of each 
boid, so the coordination comes from within. if a boid would slightly change 
its direction, it will make the others change as well, because of the rule of 
alignment. if a boid for some reason changes too much, it loses the contact 
with the group. this last scenario is in some way conservative, because 
the rules of alignment and of cohesion are given computing the average 
behaviour.
the case of leadership in the behaviour of social groups can be explained 
extending reynolds’ rules. a leader needs a group whose members decide 
to follow the rule of alignment. a leader is able to stay with the group and to 
exercise his leadership by changing gradually the group’s direction. this kind 
of authority has been qualified by Max Weber as charismatic. A figure such as 
Figure 3. The 3 rules of behaviour of flockmates (from http://www.red3d.com/cwr/boids/)
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gandhi is particularly interesting to consider here. as a charismatic authority 
he followed the rule of cohesion with the group, fighting for the common feeling 
of being victims of injustice. he was able to lead the indian nation against the 
authority, which up to that moment had been accepted (the failure of india’s 
First War of independence proves that there was an acceptance, though 
reluctant), by showing that it was illegitimate.
charismatic leader is a role and authority is one of his qualities. the normal 
way of such a leader to exercise his deontic power is indirect. charismatic 
authorities rule through advices mostly given to persons that ask for them, 
or through example and persuasion. it is always possible for the group to 
change a leader which loses the qualities that let his leadership emerge. any 
good emergent leader knows someway that his power is fragile, not being 
granted by a formal institution and depending very much on circumstances. 
in splendid ancient rome, where being well dressed was a sign of power 
and of social distinction, Petronius was an authority (he was known with 
the informal title of arbiter elegantiae), because of his good taste. in the dark 
times of the early middle ages it is likely that Petronius’ qualities would not 
have been noticed, or developed.
Searle develops his social theory starting from a theoretical construction 
based on a speech act theory. his model is the result of a construction: from 
a few notions Searle explains much, but unfortunately not all that counts. no 
surprise. Using few and simple notions, within the field of the social sciences, 
gives oversimplified social models. I tried to show that the theory could be 
much better just using a slightly more complex theory of rule. For this reason 
i introduced the er and i provided and discussed some examples within the 
field of social reality. The ER helps to explain, for example, how it is possible 
to solve some coordination problems, how a new currency can rise, how 
even enemies can find a way to cease hostilities, but also how friendship and 
charismatic leadership develop.
there is still much to be done to provide a social theory better than Searle’s. 
For example there is the need to explain social bonds and their ontology and 
to stress the importance of affectivity. in the meantime, to accept the er 
will be a step in the right direction.
4. 
Conclusions
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